cal understanding was the essential constituent of a systematic understanding; the task was simultaneously "to systematize history and to historicize reason" (53). This was not just Hegel's predilection. In fi eld after fi eld, Ziolkowski fi nds a key fi gure making the same argument. Hegel wrote: " [T] he study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself" (cited, 44) . Friedrich Schlegel put it similarly: " [H] istory is a becoming philosophy and philosophy a completed history" (cited, 177) . And Gustav Hugo, the founder of the "historical school of law," wrote: " [T] he whole science of law is nothing else than the history of law" (cited, 107). Savigny, Hugo's great successor, insisted the proper study of law was precisely to seek systematic understanding only through a painstakingly historical understanding. Ziolkowski points out that just these principles animated Friedrich Schleiermacher's On Religion (1799), which asserted that "[r]eligious men are wholly historical" (cited, 87). That is, religion is always a concrete worldview. One can never abstract away from "positive religion" but must, instead, historicize: fi nd when "every positive religion appears most youthful and fresh [. . .] during its development and its blossoming" (cited, 86). For Schleiermacher, as for Savigny and Hegel, system could only be anchored in history: "any meaningful theology must be based on a historical understanding of religion" (97).
The case of medicine seals Ziolkowski's argument. He identifi es as a decisive "paradigm shift" in the life sciences at the end of the 18 th century "the temporalization of science [. . .] synchronicity yielded to diachronicity, status to development, and mechanics to dynamics" (139). The autobiographical writings of Carl Gustav Carus attested to the driving impulse of the age: "the principle of a higher unity, emerging in the light of Naturphilosophie" (cited, 163). As the term Naturphilosophie suggests, the key fi gure here was Friedrich Schelling, who insisted that nature be understood as process, not product, as natura naturans, not natura naturata, and hence temporalized to discern its "productivity, genesis, and development" (144). "The process that Schelling calls Bildung 'occurs through epigenesis (through metamorphosis or dynamic evolution)' " (144). Ziolkowski endorses Robert Richards' positive assessment in The Romantic Conception of Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) of the role of Schelling and Naturphilosophie for the history of science (xii, 146), affi rming that "the majority of physicians and naturalists in Germany for the next few decades were profoundly, often passionately, committed to the notions of Naturphilosophie" (146).
In his conclusion, Ziolkowski justly claims to have demonstrated "the striking parallels between Hegel's Phenomenology and the works of his Romantic contemporaries, as well as their common source in Herder" (172). It is with this last point that I would like to conclude. Indeed, Ziolkowski does clearly point to Herder at every turn in his account. He begins with the observation that "it was Hegel's ambition, as it had been Herder's [. . .] to encompass in a single volume the entire knowledge of Western civilization" (53). Turning to Schleiermacher, Ziolkowski observes that in an early essay, "On Instruction in History," the theologian "sounds almost like Herder" (81). Similarly, Hugo's great Lehrbuch der Geschichte des römischen Rechts (1790) "displays a pronounced similarity to Herder's closely contemporaneous philosophy of history" (108). Savigny explicitly studied and incorporated Herder into his methodology, becoming in the process "as all-encompassing as Herder" (110). In the treatment of the life sciences Ziolkowski makes the most important case. "Young naturalists sought, in particular, to fi nd in nature correspondences to the progressive idea of Herder" (139). "What has been called 'the peculiar relationship between the concepts of history and ontogeny in German Romanticism' can be traced back to Herder, whose Ideas are quoted by Schelling in his Draft and cited frequently by the naturalists of the period" (154). Ziolkowski points to Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert, "the leading promulgator and popularizer of Naturphilosophie" (155), who came under the personal infl uence of Herder in Weimar and whose greatest work "bears more than a superfi cial resemblance to the Ideas of his mentor Herder" (156). As a scholar who has devoted many years and pages to trying to establish the importance of this connection, I welcome Ziolkowski's book as congenially as he welcomed the parallel endeavors of Robert Richards. The imagining of a sense of national identity and its evolution from constructed myth to widely shared conviction has become a prominent topic of cultural and literary analysis. It is particularly signifi cant in the case of Germany in view of its rapid development from a congeries of loyalties to principalities large and small along with unclear geographical and linguistic defi nitions at the beginning of the nineteenth century to a widely shared kleindeutsch patriotism under Prussian auspices after unifi cation in 1871. Brent Peterson sees this change of consciousness as having been imaged in literature: "When consensus about a German identity fi nally arrived, if it ever did, it was almost certainly mediated in fi ctional form" (75). This is not, however, primarily a matter of the canonical tradition; except for Kleist and agitators like Arndt and Körner, "national literature" was not "synonymous with the literature of nationalism," which sought "a level of literary quality on a par with France and England" (74) . The project of imagining the nation is more to be found in popular literature, in the historical novels that large numbers of people read. There are some well-known names here, such as Fontane and Fanny Lewald, in addition to authors on the periphery of the cultural memory like Fouqué or Alexis, and a number of others most of us are unlikely to have read or even heard of. A central fi gure is Luise Mühlbach, whose cause Peterson has been championing for some time, though not on qualitative grounds. He admits that "most of what ordinary people read was produced by writers of middling ability"; "some texts may be dreadful" (25). The historical novel competed with the rise of narrative history by imagining personal characteristics and private sensibilities, especially of ordinary people normally not within the purview of academic history. Peterson has examined a large corpus of texts, fi nding in his extremely detailed observations not a linear evolution but a wide variety of opinions and insecurities of attitude about the defi nition and boundaries of "Germany," the identifi cation of and the relationship to legitimate authority, and the prospects for the future. Much of his discussion is concentrated on several historical nodes and the ways in which their understanding was rewritten in fi ction. One of these is the evolution of Friedrich II to "Old Fritz," from the dour, misanthropic, French-speaking, ruthless military aggressor to "Germany's favorite uncle," who "becomes a commoner," "wise and approachable, feared yet benevolent, just, and most important, prototypically German" (101, 96, 98) ,
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